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C.: Contributory Negligence of Young Children
STUDENT NOTES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF YOUNG CHILDREN
The law in West Virginia on the subject of contributory
negligence of very young children was in doubt before the recent
case of Marsh v. Riley' was decided, and, instead of being settled
by that decision, the doubt has been increased. In Marsh v. Riley,
an infant plaintiff, four years and four months old, was involved.
The court said, though the statement was not necessary to the decision: "Moreover, a child of such tender years cannot be guilty of
contributory negligence." This dictum, in itself, is not remarkable. A majority of jurisdictions, by holding and dicta, subscribe
to a similar view. 2 The West Virginia court had used language to
the same effect before,3 and such, until 1922, had been its rule for
half a century. From these utterances of the court, it was apparent that the rule extended to all children under seven years
of age. 4
In Prunty v. Tyler Traction Co.,5 there was an intimation that
the rule had changed. In that case, under the particular circumstances, it was held not to be error to refuse to submit to a jury
the question of contributory negligence of a child three years and
three months old, but a statement, not necessary to the decision,
was added that, under other circumstances, a child of three years
and three months might. be contributorily negligent, and that, in
some cases, it would be properly a jury question. This intimation
of the court's departure from its long established rule was confirmed ten years later in Pierson v. Liming.6 There the judgment
1188 S. E. 748 (W. Va. 1936). The child was badly burned when its clothing caught fire from a heater in a common bathroom maintained by tenants.
2 Some recent cases are: Sinclair Relining Co. v. Gray, 191 Ark. 175, 83 S. W.
(2d) 820 (1935) ; Delivery Co. v. Turley, 44 Ga. App. 32, 160 S. E. 517 (1931);
Dipino v. Gulino and Son, 154 So. 772 (La. 1934); Farrel v. Hidish, 132 Me.
57, 165 Atl. 903 (1933) ; Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372, 43 P.
(2d) 896 (1935); Hogan v. Etna Concrete Block Co., 325 Pa. 49, 188 Atl. 763
(1936); Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S. C. 109, 156 S. E. 179 (1930); Walkup
v. Covington, 18 Tenn. App. 117, 73 S. W. (2d) 713 (1934). For other cases
see (1936) 107 A. L. R. 71 et seq.
3 Washington v. B. & 0. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 (1880) ; Gibson v. City of
Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 18 S. E. 447 (1893) ; Dicken v. Liverpool Salt and
Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S. E. 582 (1895) ; Gunn v. Ohio R. Co., 42 W. Va.
676, 26 S. E. 546 (1896); Parrish v. City of Huntington, 57 W. Va. 286, 50
S. E. 416 (1905); Ewing v. Lanark Fuel Co., 65 W. Va. 726, 65 S. E. 200
(1909).
4 Particularly dictum in Ewing v. Lanark Fuel Co., 65 W. Va. 726, 65 S. E.
200 (1909).
r90 W. Va. 145, 167 S. E. 131 (1922); See Note (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q.
303.
6 113 W. Va. 145, 167 S. E. 131 (1932).
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of the lower court was reversed on the ground that an instruction
failed to take clearly to the jury the question of contributory
negligence of a child six years and three months old. The opinion
declares that "Whether a child is capable of exercising any care
is determined by its age, intelligence, experience, discretion, previous training, maturity, alertness, and the nature of the danger
encountered.'7 The rule that a child under seven years can not
be chargeable with contributory negligence was definitely abandoned. Four years later, in Marsh v. Riley, where the child was
a month older than the infant plaintiff in the Prunty case, the court
voiced the above dictum that a child of such tender years can not
be contributorily negligent.
As a consequence of these conflicting expressions, there is considerable confusion as to what the law may be in this jurisdiction.
It does not necessarily follow from Marsh v. Riley that the court
has abandoned the doctrine of Pierson v. Liming, nor that there
has been a return to the rule that a child less than seven years old
is incapable of contributory negligence. Probably no court would
deny that there is an age at which a child is incapable of being
paegligent. The Prunty case indicated this age to be something less
than three years and three months. But the latest expression in
West Virginia indicated this age to be above three years and four
months, and is a flat denial of the earlier proposition. Whether
or not the court was aware of this, it would appear, from a consideration of Marsh V. Riley, that the court went back to an 1895
decision to find a holding on a question of imputed negligence,
found there also a dictum on contributory negligence, and adopted
it without consideration of its more recent decisions. The
language of this early opinion which the court cites in Marsh v.
Riley, is similar to that of the latter. It states: "I do not think
the negligence of the parent can be imputed to this child, two
years and ten months old, or that it can be guilty of contributory
negligence."
The court, in Pierson v. Liming, makes the assertion that a
majority of courts follow the rule there announced. As to a child
of six years and three months, the assertion may be well founded;
but as to a child of five years and three months, a recent Wisconsin
7 See Dupuis v. Heider, 113 ila. 679, 152 So. 659 (1934), using similar
language.
a Dicken v. Liverpool Salt and Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S. E. 582 (1895).
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case 9 finds the "overwhelming weight of authority" the other way,
in accord with the proposition that a child of that age is incapable
of contributory negligence. These two positions are indicative of
the zone which gives the courts most difficulty. Recent decisions
in several states are in line with the Wisconsin case. 10 Some jurisdictions still apply the rule to all children under seven years of
age." Another court takes the position that, under particular circumstances, a child of eight years can not be chargeable with contributory negligence. 2
13
On the contrary, at least five late decisions in other states
reject the rule that a child under seven years old is incapable of
contributory negligence. It is asserted that this rule, borrowed
from the criminal law, is arbitrary. The supreme court of Florida,
in a recent case, takes this position, and adopts the reasoning of an
earlier Vermont case.' 4 It is suggested that more capacity is required to understand the nature of a criminal act than is necessary
to the exercise of care for one's own safety. The time at which
children cease to be incapable of care can not be arbitrarily determined, say these courts. But, actually, whether the determining
age is set at seven, six, five, four or three years and three months,
there is still an arbitrary determination made. In a late case, the
Minnesota court, giving approval to the view taken in Massachusetts, " that contributory negligence of a child less than seven years
old may be a question for the jury, says: "It does not cast upon
the public any and all risks that may be created by the carelessness
of a child. Still, it does not .... hold a child to a degree of care
not commensurate with its age and experience." This seems to

9 Ruka v. Zierer, 195 Wis. 285, 218 N. W. 358 (1928).
'o Brzyski v. Schreiber, 314 Pa. 353, 171 Atl. 614 (1934) ; Johnson v. Herring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 Pac. 535 (1931); McKinney v. Winterstein, 122 Neb.
679, 241 N. W. 112 (1932) ; Seidlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 41 N. W. 535
(1932); Flickinger v. Phillips, 221 Iowa 837, 267 . W. 101 (1936); see
Dipino v. Gulino; Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., both .upra n. 2.
"Claren v. Gillespie, 250 Ill. App. 53 (1928); Belcher, Adm'r v. Smyth
Co., 243 Ill. App. 65 (1926); Tupman's Adm'r v. Schmidt, 200 Ky. 88, 254
S. W. 199 (1923); Johnson v. Herring; Flickinger v. Phillips, both supra n. 10;
Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S. C. 109, 156 S. E. 179 (1930).
12Brzyski v. Schreiber, 314 Pa. 353, 171 Ati. 614 (1934) ; Thomas v. Southern Penn. Traction Co., 270 Pa. 146, 112 Atl. 918 (1921).
13 Dupuis v. Heider, 113 la. 679, 152 So. 659 (1934); Garis v. Eberling,
18 Tenn. App. 1, 71 S. W. (2d) 215 (1934); Morris v. Furniture Co., 207 N.
C. 358, 117 S. E. 13 (1934); Thornton v. Ionia Fair Ass'n, 229 Mich. 1, 200
N. W. 958 (1924) ; Arivabeno v. Nuse, 12 N. J. Misc. 729, 174 Atl. 691 (1934);
Eckhardt v. Hansen, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N. W. 776 (1936).
14 Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Vt. 132, 106 AtI 682 (1918).
15 Sullivan v. Boston EL R. Co., 192 Mass. 37, 78 N. E. 382 (1906).
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urge that the public should be protected from acts of children. It
is as reasonable to assert that children, less capable of exercising
care, ought to be protected from the carelessness of individual
members of the public. This seems to be one basis at least for the
recognized presumption that small children have not been negligent, even where the presumption is not conclusive. Most of the
courts which deny a conclusive presumption admit a rebuttable
one."0 It should be kept in mind that, at any event, the negligence
of a defendant must be established before there may be a recovery.
There is no question involved of burdening an innocent public with
the careless acts of small children.
The decisions in few states are sufficiently numerous to indicate where particular courts draw the line. Massachusetts holds
that a child of three years and one month is incapable of contributory negligence.'Y But, of a child of four years, the same court
asserts that, while a child of that age is too young to possess much
prudence, it can not be said, as a matter of law, that such a child
s
is incapable of exercising any care.' A few courts might conceivably go this far. Perhaps these courts feel, as the West Virginia court suggests in Prunty v. Traction Co., that, at any event,
no reasonable jury is likely to find a child of very tender years
guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to bar recovery against
an adult wrongdoer. By way of dictum, at least, the West Virginia
court now seems to adopt the view of this supposed reasonable
jury.
C. L. C.
THE MODERN TENDENCY TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF THE AESTHETIC
While recognizing as nuisances those things which are unduly
offensive to the senses of smell or hearing,' equity has generally
refused to recognize as nuisances those things which are offensive
2
to the eye or aesthetic tastes, even when the presence of the thing
Boykin v. Coast Line R. Co., 211 N. C. 113, 189 S. E. 177 (1936).
londeau v. Kay, 282 Mass. 452, 184 N. E. 926 (1933).
is McIfonough v. Vazzela, 247 Mass. 552, 142 N. E. 831 (1924).
'6

27

1 CLARK, EQUiTY (1924)

§ 203; WOOD, LAw OF NUISANCES (2d ed. 1883)

§ 3.

2 WooD, LAw OF NUIsANCEs §§ 3, 7; Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, 303,
97 Am. Dec. 654 (1868); Lane v. City of Concord, 70 N. H. 485, 49 Atl. 687
(1900) ; Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 Atl. 516 (1906) ; Woodstock Burial
Ground Ass'n v. Hager, 68 Vt. 488, 35 Atl. 431 (1896); Houston Gas & Fuel
Co. v. Harlow, 297 S. W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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